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This paper examines disparities between unitary central 
governments and local governments in how environmen-
tal policy is defined and implemented at the local level. 
This is done within the context of northeast Asia, where 
results can often differ from expectations driven by tradi-
tional models of local government behaviour offered by the 
West. A theoretical measure for policy distance between 
the central government and its subsidiaries is constructed 
and then operationalised in a comparative context with-
in northeastern China and the Republic of Korea. Using 
local and national budget data from 23 cities with histo-
ries of environmental issues (13 in northeast China and 10 
in South Korea), the author’s measure of policy distance 
between the centre and the periphery is tested. The pa-
per finds that, contrary to traditional model expectations, 
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there is far greater concurrence between local governments 
and the national government within a democratic nation 
than there is within a communist one.
Keywords: decentralisation, local government, China, South 
Korea, policy distance 
1. Introduction
The current premier of the People’s Republic of China, Li Keqiang, has 
signalled a renewed emphasis on reconciling rapid economic growth with 
environmental concerns. “[We] declare war against pollution as we de-
clared war against poverty,” was the key point made by Premier Li to 
3,000 delegates in Beijing in March 2014, as he presented the coming 
year’s priorities (Saikawa, 2014). Now, there is a new focus on the role of 
local governments which must “take responsibility for the quality of their 
environments”. The central government has watched cities continually fall 
short of their monitoring benchmarks for pollution, and so a “new ap-
proach” is being tested.
This new approach, however, does not differ substantively from the pre-
vious approach. The central government has told local officials what their 
policy goals are (pollution reduction and caps on levels), but they have 
not outlined how this goal is to be achieved. Consequently, each local 
government is left to its own devices to discover how (and by how much) 
pollution can be reduced within its own jurisdiction. This mirrors, in many 
ways, the situation in South Korea, China’s neighbour to the east, where 
local governments have been the enforcers of national pollution reduction 
policies for the past twenty years. South Korea has also taken the some-
what uncharacteristic step (from a unitary system perspective) of delegat-
ing all regulatory activity to the local level (Lee, Kim & Ahn, 1999). In 
districts that have seen rapid industrialisation over the past thirty years, 
local fortunes have been made as deals have been struck between political 
and economic elites. Hence the question of which interest – that of the 
national government, of local economic elites, or the local public – is most 
likely to influence the local governments’ response remains unanswered. 
As both countries try to move towards a post-industrial economy, the 
chance for new coalitions to be built at the local level is also rising.
The paper examines two different approaches to understanding national 
influence over local governments when faced with a policy mandate in a 
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newly decentralised implementation environment. First, it presents the 
commonly used policy models that are borrowed by Chinese and Korean 
scholars with graduate training in the West, but which often fall short in 
terms of providing the appropriate theoretical constructs when applied to 
the context of their home countries. Second, starting with an examination 
of model assumptions that are often violated in these contexts, it looks at 
other literatures to try and build a new set of expectations based on the 
conditions in East Asia. It examines the context of local government deci-
sion-making in northeast China, a region that has a long history of heavy 
industry and coincident environmental cost. It compares this history to that 
of South Korea, where industrial restructuring has begun to incorporate 
the environmental concerns that China is currently voicing. Finally, using 
local government environmental expenditures data, the paper outlines the 
recent behaviour of local officials in both countries to see how they re-
spond to local constituencies, rather than central authority. Using this data, 
a measure of “policy distance” between the centre and local governments is 
constructed, and it is argued that this measure can be used in a comparative 
context to judge the relative influence of the centre over the periphery in 
a given policy area. The measure indicates that Chinese local government 
officials are less responsive to (and further from) changes in the centre with 
regard to environmental policy, whereas Korean local government officials 
are closer, on average, to the national government’s lead.
After testing the premise of policy distance in the two countries, the discus-
sion goes back to the issue of appropriate interpretation of the results, given 
the contexts in which the model has been tested. The paper concludes that 
the different contexts of Korea and China lead to an important distinction 
in the way in which local officials respond to national mandates in the two 
nations: Korean officials orient themselves towards the centre (vertical ori-
entation), but Chinese officials orient themselves towards those of similar 
rank in other local governments (horizontal orientation) with whom they 
have established a solid historical relationship (Lee, 1998; Li, 2010). Thus 
the behaviour of local officials may not be interpreted in the same fashion 
as might be the case in a competitive local government “market”.
2. Incentive Structures from the Centre to the 
Periphery: A Brief Review of the Literature
The way in which local government interactions are structured with a na-
tional government and with each other is theorised differently in Euro-
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pean and US contexts. However, these distinctions are often overlooked 
in countries outside the West, when scholars are looking for a theoretical 
framework that may help them better understand their own local govern-
ment behaviour. As indigenous theories of local government behaviour 
in East Asia are still being developed, many studies (in English) of local 
government behaviour in China and South Korea borrow and test the-
ories that have been developed in the West. This has led to somewhat 
unusual findings in the research conducted in these countries, partly be-
cause the nature of theoretical assumptions is often misunderstood or not 
known prior to the attempt to test these theories in new contexts. Here, 
the theories that are most often used (or abused) in East Asian contexts, 
including Japan1 are briefly summarised, and the ways in which this might 
be remedied in future research are highlighted.
2.1.  From Coordinating, Inclusive, and Overlapping 
Authority to Competition, Neoliberal Urban 
Economies, and Lateral Orientations
Central-local relationships. Deil Wright’s (1978) seminal work on inter-
governmental relations (IGR) seemed to find its place in the East Asian 
lexicon in the late 1980s in Japan, at a time when Japanese academics 
like Michio Muramatsu (1997) and Mikiko Iwasaki (1985) were challeng-
ing the orthodoxy of older Japanese theorists. For Muramatsu especially, 
Wright’s model of inclusive authority seemed a much better fit for Japa-
nese central-local relations than the prevailing theories of the time. Those 
theories suffered from a lack of context, which he argued could only be 
arrived at in a comparative analysis. As he puts it: “It is interesting that 
both the United States and Japan are strongly imbued with the ideology 
of local government as independent from the state. In Japan, because the 
demands of local governing bodies have come to be understood as part of 
a pressure group process, in competition with the various other demands, 
there is a tendency for local government to justify itself through the free-
dom to oppose the state. Here, a divergence between theory (autonomy 
from the state) and reality (autonomy vis-Þ-vis the state) arises. Thus the 
‘theories’ advocated make the understanding of the reality vague.” (Mu-
ramatsu, 1997, p. 7).
1 The intergovernmental literature from Japan is included here for perspective only.
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Muramatsu’s conclusion that central-local relationships in unitary devel-
oped states, such as Japan and South Korea, could be comparable to those 
outlined in Wright’s model was important. However, he made it clear that 
such a comparison was only appropriate in case of certain adjustments for 
the unique circumstances of post-World War II development in Japan’s 
different spheres of power: political, administrative, and economic. For 
Japan, the increasingly important role of political parties as a mechanism 
to link central-local relations has countered, to some extent, the adminis-
trative power of the central government (Muramatsu, 1997, p. 26).
Choi and Wright (2004) note that Japan and South Korea share many 
common historical traits. Thus the conclusions that Muramatsu draws 
about the inclusive authority model might also be considered appropri-
ate for South Korea. However, South Korea’s dalliance with popular 
sovereignty has been far more fickle than that of Japan, and the result 
in South Korea is a political landscape that is markedly regionalised in 
terms of party dominance, with different political parties drawing on 
local strongholds for national support. This often results in a relatively 
muted impact of political party affiliations with respect to local budget 
priorities. In contrast, the administrative apparatus maintains tight con-
trol over local administrative behaviour, and as such, local civil servants 
tend to focus on the national government’s directives regardless of the 
party majority of local level politicians (Choi & Wright, 2004, p. 9). 
Such behaviour has been ascribed to certain cultural constructs, such 
as the heavy Confucian influence on civil servants in South Korea (Im, 
Campbell & Cha, 2013).
China, as neither a developed state nor a democratic one, has not dab-
bled with Wright’s IGR model, and Chinese scholars have remained silent 
regarding its utility for the Chinese context. Part of the reason for this 
silence is the current interpretation of “federalism” by the Communist 
Party leadership (Bristow, 2011) as being somewhat synonymous with 
pro-democracy factions. Li (2010) illustrates the substantial divide be-
tween China and its neighbours with respect to the inclusive authority 
model. As a communist state, the boundaries between economic, polit-
ical, and administrative behaviour are markedly different from those of 
a democratic system. The constant tension between the forces of cen-
tralisation and decentralisation has been a recurring theme in East Asia, 
but in China especially, due to its geographic size and dense population. 
Where the inclusive authority model emphasises links between both the 
central government and each of the lower levels, within China, the na-
ture of these links is political and ideological, where a Communist Party 
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official may serve alongside a mayor or provincial governor to ensure that 
decisions are made in keeping with party doctrine. Thus central power is 
exercised through the Party and its representatives, who are also strate-
gically placed throughout the administrative apparatus of the state. En-
forcement of central mandates is therefore carried out through a com-
bination of sanctions (threats) and incentives (promotions). Over time, 
however, administrative power has slowly shifted to the provinces (Li, 
2010), with some provincial governments enjoying increased jurisdiction 
over implementation of central decisions. This has been true of fiscal re-
lations as well (Li, 2010).
To summarise, one of the central shortcomings of using an intergovern-
mental model such as Wright’s in the South Korean and Chinese contexts 
has been the lack of a universal suffrage mechanism (until recently in 
South Korea2) for choosing subnational political representatives. This is 
one of the reasons why scholars from these countries do not necessarily 
see the IGR models as an appropriate fit, and why China and SouthKore-
an differ from its East Asian neighbour, Japan.
Local-local relations. Local government theory, on the other hand, has 
been a far more popular body of literature for South Korean and Chinese 
academics. In particular, the so-called “neo-liberal” theories of local gov-
ernment behaviour have sparked considerable interest. Beginning with 
Charles Tiebout in 1956 (Tiebout, 1956), and continuing with Paul Peter-
son in 1981 and 1995 (Peterson, 1981; Peterson, 1995), theories of local 
government behaviour from the United States have been turned “inside 
out”. Previous theoretical models of local government decision-making 
focused on dynamics that were internal to cities: political coalitions, elite 
politics, pluralistic models on a city scale, party politics, and even bureau-
cratic decision-making. Many of these models still dominate the literature 
on local government behaviour (Stone, 2008; Dahl, 1961; Lowi, 1969), 
and most focus solely on the internal dynamics of city governments and 
the variables that may explain the kinds of policy decisions and implemen-
tation choices such governments make. In countries lacking a strong lo-
cal government democratic apparatus, however, the more recent theories 
hold more promise.
Building on Tiebout’s thesis, Peterson (1981) argued that “internal” mod-
els treat city governments as if they were “nation states”, and that this cre-
2 Local governments held elections for local posts for the first time in 1995, again in 
1998, and every four years since (Choi & Wright, 2004).
749






























ated fundamental flaws in the conclusions drawn from the research. First 
and foremost was the issue of jurisdiction and boundary control: nation 
states often control their boundaries and can regulate the flow of people, 
goods, and capital across their borders, while cities, or local governments, 
cannot. This means that local governments are limited in their ability to 
control whether or not desirable residents (the median taxpayers) stay or 
go. Tiebout theorises that this sets up a competition amongst city gov-
ernments to maximise their share of these residents, and Peterson argues 
that this drives the kinds of policies local governments will then pursue: 
allocative where distributions of public goods and resources are dispersed 
fairly uniformly throughout the local government’s jurisdiction, but not 
redistributive.
This model has two main characteristics that are salient in the context of 
this analysis. First, cities compete with each other for median taxpayers, 
but not in a completely laissez faire manner. Cities compete within “tiers”, 
or within a certain peer group (Minkoff, 2012), so that there are layers 
of competition, usually dictated by the size and complexity of the local 
economy. So, for example, Cincinnati might compete with Buffalo, but 
neither of them would compete with New York City. Second, because 
local governments have limits on their ability to keep residents from leav-
ing (restrictions on movement), they focus on incentives enacted through 
policy selection. So Cincinnati might pay a great deal of attention to the 
“bundle of services” offered by Buffalo to its residents so that it may offer 
a similar or better (if possible) mix. In the US, this model has gained a 
great deal of currency, and has been demonstrated to predict policy choic-
es at the local level with a much better level of explanatory power than 
the previous “internal” models. It has also formed the basis for a number 
of current models that are being tested increasingly in contexts outside of 
the US (Tavares & Carr, 2013; Feiock, Francis & Kassekert, 2010), with 
some degree of success.
However, within the European context, other models are often used to 
explain local behaviour, where the assumption of a stronger relationship 
between national and local governments can be fulfilled (e.g. Johansson, 
Niklasson & Persson, 2015). It should be noted that “stronger” does not 
necessarily mean top-down, where the initiative comes from a national 
government and local governments are simple instructed delegates (Na-
kamura & Smallwood, 1980). The local level can often be the initiator, 
but the national government plays an important role in how far the local 
initiative may be taken. Such models often focus on both the political and 
the administrative behaviour within a local government, but assume some 
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degree of structural uniformity across jurisdictions within a particular na-
tion-state. In this sense, European models differ from their US counter-
parts, where there is considerable variation in the structure of elections, ju-
risdictions, and the administrative apparatus of local government (district 
vs. at-large elections, strong mayor vs. council-manager administrations, 
patronage vs. professional administrations, e.g. Tao & Feiock, 1999). So, 
although there is considerable variation throughout Western Europe, the 
way in which local government behaviour is examined and framed does 
not necessarily focus on structural variation of this kind, nor does it always 
focus on policy typologies at the local level (Peters, Schroter & Maravic, 
2015). However, there is an acknowledgement that local governments do 
pay attention to what other local governments do. This lateral orientation, 
while distinct in nature from the US context, is still a valid characteristic 
of the models used to predict behaviour.
It should also be noted that a lateral orientation does not necessarily 
mean competitive. Cooperation across local jurisdictions in the provision 
of public services, as outlined in the inter-local collective action (ICA) 
model (Clingermayer & Feiock, 2001), may be preferable to competi-
tion in the case of local governments that find themselves strapped for 
funds and lacking the expertise necessary to provide what their constit-
uents need. Thus the behaviour of local governments can be simultane-
ously competitive (within their tier) and cooperative (a central city and 
smaller surrounding suburbs, for example). The reason this distinction is 
important is because each set of theories is, of course, predicated on the 
examples and cases with which researchers in different geographies are 
familiar. Thus when we “borrow” a theoretical model to test it in a new 
context, we need to remain mindful of the assumptions that are built into 
the model and ensure that we do not violate a fundamental premise that 
renders our empirical investigation moot. This becomes somewhat prob-
lematic when we venture into contexts that are unfamiliar, or where the 
existing assumptions are poorly understood.
This can be demonstrated by a brief example from the South Korean liter-
ature on local government behaviour. Many academics in South Korea do 
their graduate work in the US, and therefore learn theoretical models that 
are appropriate and testable within the US context. But there is often a 
temptation to take a model that has gained currency in the literature (for 
example, the “neighbours” policy adoption thesis, Berry & Berry, 1990) 
and import the model into the Korean context in order to test it. While 
such ambition is to be applauded, care must be taken to uphold the fun-
damental principles often outlined in comparative analyses.
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The “neighbours” thesis posits that local governments (or states/provinc-
es) will look at what their neighbours do, and policy adoptions will often 
spread geographically as one locality (or state/province) demonstrates 
success. There is no reason to believe that this might not be the case in 
South Korea, except for the violation of two assumptions of the model: 
first, the model assumes that the subnational government has a certain 
degree of autonomy and policy edicts do not have to come from the na-
tional government; second, the model assumes that local governments ori-
ent themselves towards each other (as one might expect in a competitive 
environment). However, neither of these assumptions is supported within 
the Korean context. South Korea, as is mentioned in the introduction, has 
a unitary form of government, which means that local governments are 
structurally smaller versions of the national government, and each has a 
similar administrative and jurisdictional function. Policy areas are dictat-
ed by the centre and this dictation is enforced in budgetary terms, where 
local governments are not responsible for creating new policy. So the idea 
of a lateral orientation where local governments cooperate or compete 
with each other is not supported at all. Additionally, because policy edicts 
are issued by the central government, local governments tend to orient 
themselves towards the centre, rather than towards each other. Thus a 
“neighbours” thesis is simply untenable in the South Korean context.
So, an examination of relevant models that may be applicable to the 
South Korean and Chinese models needs to be careful to include the 
assumptions on which the models are premised. The following section 
will focus on the way in which unitary systems may be addressed, given 
the literature on such systems. This will include brief explications of the 
South Korean and Chinese contexts, so that the appropriateness of a giv-
en model can be seen.
3.  Brief Review of Recent History in Northeast 
China and the Republic of Korea
The northeast provinces of modern China border Russia to the north and 
North Korea to the east, and their economic and political history is there-
fore firmly tied to the development models of the former Soviet Union 
(Wang et al., 2014). In the early 1950s, after the establishment of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China in 1949, the adoption of a Stalinist industrialisation 
model began in the northeast of China, where expertise and materials for 
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constructing large-scale factories for the production of steel, coal refineries, 
and other building blocks for industrial development were close at hand. 
The Japanese occupation of these areas had also initiated the process of ex-
traction of natural resources, which was continued under Mao Zhe Dong’s 
“Great Leap Forward” policy, to try and pull China’s largely agrarian socie-
ty into the industrial age (Wang et al, 2014; Bianco, 1971).
The industrialisation process was concentrated in the Liaoning, Heilong-
jiang, and Jilin provinces, with several of the major cities there, such as She-
nyang and Benxi, becoming synonymous with industrial prowess (Wang et 
al., 2014). But such prowess came at a considerable environmental cost. 
In the fall of 1988, a foreign language expert posted to the city of Benxi 
to help train university students and professors in English proficiency was 
greeted enthusiastically by the city’s major, who said with great pride, 
“Welcome to the city of Benxi, the most polluted city in China!”3 Benxi, 
like most cities in the region, burned coal to provide heat during the win-
ter, for cooking purposes in homes, and to provide electricity. As industry 
grew and demands for power increased, the burning of coal as the main 
source of energy meant that the air quality in most industrial areas resem-
bled that of London during the 19th century, where the smog was so thick, 
it resembled “pea soup” (Strebel & Lehman, 2013). By the mid-1980s, 
resource depletion and the use of coal for energy had created constant 
problems with air quality, but there was little indication from the govern-
ment that such issues posed health hazards to the population. However, 
China was by no means alone in its approach to industrial development.
In the Republic of Korea, during the 1960s and ‘70s, when the country 
was ruled by Park Chung-hee, father of the current president, Park Geun 
Hye, the push to do the same – namely to industrialise the largely agricul-
tural south of the Korean peninsula – was pursued with almost messianic 
fervour (Chapin, 1969). The motivation came from the need to provide 
opportunities for economic advancement to the population, especially in 
comparison to the more advanced (at that time) north. But the Republic 
of Korea had virtually no natural resources upon which it could draw to 
achieve its goals; all natural resources were located to the north of the 38th 
parallel. So, the government of Park Chung-hee drew on its relationships 
with Japan and the US, its closest allies, in order to pursue its economic 
development goals.
3 Volunteers in Asia (VIA) (1989). Interview with Curtis, Benxi representative, in 
Xi’an city, January 10.
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Both countries were successful in bringing industrialisation to their pop-
ulations, but both paid the environmental costs for doing so. Pollution 
of drinking water, air quality degradation, and soil contamination are all 
issues that have led to increasing mortality rates in both countries for inci-
dences of stomach and lung cancer. Lung cancer is currently the number 
one cause of cancer-related deaths in China, and all cancers are now the 
leading cause of death in South Korea (Jung et al., 2012; Chen et al., 
2015), with rates continuing to rise over time. However, the need for a 
policy response in either country had not been recognised until relative-
ly recently. This has proceeded in somewhat different ways in the two 
countries, and therefore, I will examine those differences in the following 
section on environmental factors.
4. Terra Incognita: There Be Dragons
Unitary governments, by definition, tolerate a limited policy distance be-
tween the central government and localities when compared to more plu-
ralistic systems. However, there can be quite a bit of variation in how cen-
tral policies are realised in the peripheral regions, depending on a number 
of important factors. The literature on decentralisation and devolution 
has outlined such factors repeatedly, but some have been the focus of 
greater attention than others. Here, some of the political, institutional, 
and economic factors are reviewed that prove particularly important when 
addressing unitary systems.
4.1. Political Factors
The role of political parties and ideology in unitary systems cannot be 
overstated. Even in a “one-party” system, the differences between factions 
within the same party can be substantial. This can often play out in the 
public sphere through the different media outlets for the different ideo-
logical factions within a party. In a unitary system with competitive polit-
ical parties, such as South Korea, such outlets sometimes follow partisan 
lines but may also be affiliated with an ideological slant. This can mean 
that one gets markedly different takes on national policy depending on 
which media source one reads. By reading several, one can become aware 
of intraparty disputes as well as interparty disagreement.
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In the case of policy issues that have a geographical dimension, as most 
decentralisation issues do, the media can take on an important role in 
shaping local opinion as well as informing it. Regional politics can play out 
in local media outlets that do not always get airplay in the capital (Kwok 
et al., 2002). Thus one of the ways in which policy distance between the 
centre and the periphery can be assessed is to examine how a central pol-
icy is portrayed in local media outlets, especially those that share ideolog-
ical or partisan ties to the ruling central party. The stronger the criticism 
or disagreement voiced at the local level, the greater the distance between 
the two.
Another political factor of importance is the power of local interests. Par-
ties may be one such power, but in environmental policy there are other 
interests that traditionally play important roles. Industry, especially that 
which employs a large workforce but may also generate a great deal of pol-
lution, can be quick to pressure a local government that is seen as “over-
zealous” in its enforcement of environmental regulations. This relation-
ship can be further complicated by strong ties between state (or formerly 
state-owned) industries and local government officials. This is a problem 
in China and South Korea, where state support of industry has made local 
governments both de jure and de facto partners. This kind of pressure is 
presumed to be constant and strong in both countries, and especially tied 
to the economic well-being of the industry in question.
Grassroots groups can also bring pressure to bear on local officials, es-
pecially if they see public health being jeopardised by a lax approach to 
enforcement. If both are present, local officials have to either find a way 
to placate both, or choose a side and defend it. This kind of pressure can 
combine with the existing partisan and ideological landscape to produce 
local government behaviour that may deviate from central policy, creating 
a greater policy distance.
However, in both China and South Korea, the type of “local interest” has 
only recently begun to include what might be considered “citizen groups” 
or “grassroots organisations”, and the nature of these groups is distinct 
across the two countries. In China, there are citizen “committees” that 
are meant to communicate local problems to party officials so that an 
appropriate response can be rendered at the appropriate level.4 Thus the 
committees fit into the apparatus of the state in a way that is somewhat 
4 Sun H. (2014). Interviews in Incheon, South Korea on November 15 and December 
3.
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distinct from traditional notions of “citizen” or “grassroots” groups. These 
committees are meant to voice concerns, and, in earlier periods (during 
the Cultural Revolution), were meant to criticise “societal elements” that 
were not ideologically pure (Bianco, 1971). In more recent periods, such 
committees, mindful of their former reputation for brutality, have taken 
a somewhat softer tone (Fewsmith, 2000), and although members are 
expected to hear complaints, they do not expect challenges to the ruling 
structure, especially in larger urban areas.
The northeastern region of China, especially Liaoning Province, has been 
the site of forays into more democratic kinds of arrangements. Local 
elections have been held on a regular basis since the late 1990s, and an 
ongoing dialogue between local officials and the population has result-
ed in interesting policy developments in some cities within this region 
(Wang et al., 2014). However, these forays have largely occurred within 
the membership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), so although 
many official residents have been able to participate as voters, the se-
lection of candidates is still tightly controlled. Increasingly, international 
non-governmental organisations (INGOs) have been quietly making ap-
pearances within the region, but their influence on policy is difficult to 
gauge. They do, however, provide a means for “fact-checking” the central 
government’s claims about the impact of policy. Greenpeace, for exam-
ple, monitors air quality across China, and they have independently veri-
fied China’s claims to be making progress on air quality problems, using 
satellite data (Greenpeace, 2016).
In South Korea, the rise of local groups is often seen as intensely “polit-
ical” in a way that is closer to the vernacular use of the word – politics 
is personal, and is built on networks of personal relations that are wo-
ven throughout society. Thus any kind of local group that is created to 
address a shared problem is naturally assumed to draw on a particular 
network, where some groups will be set up in opposition to others, espe-
cially “others” from elsewhere. There are active environmental groups in 
South Korea as part of a growing non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
movement (Choi & Wright, 2004), but they are very much focused on 
isolated problems that are localised in nature. So, for example, if a group 
is organised to protest the placement of a new nuclear waste disposal site, 
they do not necessarily lend their expertise to other localities that may 
share the same problem.
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Environmental awareness cannot happen without some kind of shift in 
living conditions associated with a threat to public health or well-being 
(Downs, 1972). In South Korea, this awareness has been relatively slow 
to be realised, partly because of the breakneck pace of economic and in-
dustrial development over the past fifty years. As income levels rose with 
the arrival of trade and an industrial economy, concerns over air, soil, and 
water pollution took a backseat to simple improvements in living stand-
ards, including better nutrition and the associated health benefits (Chap-
in, 1969; Mkandawire & Yi, 2014). If environmental pollution is seen as 
a reasonable trade-off for general well-being, populations are generally 
willing to make that trade. It has only been within the last twenty years or 
so that pollution levels and degradation have reached a point where the 
trade-off no longer seems justified.
In China, a similar economic developmental trajectory has taken place, 
but on a scale that dwarfs conditions in neighbouring states. Additional-
ly, the communist continuum between economy and politics has served 
as both damper and catalyst for economic growth, industrialisation, and 
their subsequent environmental issues. When the central government fi-
nally committed itself to the current “marketisation” approach (Wang et 
al., 2014) as something that could be rolled out on a national basis for 
general benefit, the rate of national economic growth exploded, and the 
excessive levels of water, soil and air pollution soon followed. For China, 
the road to environmental awareness has been travelled with incredible 
speed, as has the general rise in income. But the two have not been seen 
in the same trade-off terms as witnessed in South Korea. This is partly 
because the general health of the Chinese population was relatively good 
prior to the rise in income. While health care was by no means universally 
high nor accessible across the country, one of the pillars of the legitima-
cy of the CCP was its ability to provide the previously completely desti-
tute in rural areas with access to some basic improvements in health care 
(Bianco, 1971). Thus the association between improvements in health 
(longer life, better nutrition) and an industrialised urban economy were 
not as strong in China.
For this reason, there are somewhat similar levels of environmental aware-
ness in both countries. This has been tied to general perceptions of de-
clining quality of environmental factors, especially air quality, and the 
upheaval associated with rapid (and sometimes coerced) urbanisation. As 
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the use of personal cars has risen in both countries, the associated air 
pollution levels in cities have risen, often exceeding thresholds hazardous 
to human health. China has also tapped its vast coal resources to provide 
power for a growing economy as cheaply as possible, in addition to the 
traditional practice of using coal to heat homes during the winter months. 
The combination of these factors has created air quality problems that 
have become a nearly constant reminder to citizens of both countries of 
the cost of progress.
5. Exploratory Analysis
In order to see whether the problems discussed above play out as cen-
tre-periphery issues, it is first necessary to see whether there is evidence 
that a policy distance measure can be created that captures the concept 
in a consistent fashion. The rationale for constructing such a measure will 
be explained, and then a simple test will be offered to see whether it per-
forms as expected. A discussion of the results will follow.
In both countries, there has been a solid dedication to economic growth, 
and both China and South Korea have used a national political rheto-
ric that places a “market economy” front and centre in domestic policy 
rankings. The general lack of concern for environmental problems at the 
country level can easily be seen by examining national expenditures on 
“environmental policy problems”. In both countries, the proportion of the 
national budget spent on “environmental problems” is consistently low 
(see Tables 1 and 2). 
If anything, South Korea’s concern for environmental issues has garnered 
far less support at the national level than is the case in China. Across 
administrations, from 1997 until 2011, the national government has 
consistently spent less than 1% of the national budget on environmental 
programs or concerns. However, there have been signs that this lack of 
attention takes a toll. Both countries have found themselves targets of 1) 
external criticisms by comparison: South Korea’s ranking among OECD 
nations, for example, was close to absolute last in the late 1990s, only a 
few notches up from that of North Korea (Editorial, 2002), and 2) in-
ternal complaint, where, in Beijing, for example, the rise in popularity of 
“oxygen bars” in the mid-1990s was seen as the harbinger of a general call 
for air pollution mitigation by the government (Smith, 2000). 
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Table 1: People’s Republic of China, National Environmental Budget Ex-
















































































2003  18932 1849.53 0.10
2004  21953.7 0.14 2217.91 0.17 0.10
2005  25326.3 0.13 2846.19 0.22 0.11
2006  29611.2 0.15 3049.95 0.07 0.10
2007  37084.8 0.20 3939.39 0.23 0.11
2008  45825.3 0.19 5479.67 0.28 0.12
2009  56236 0.19 5701.01 0.04 0.10
2010  89575 0.37 8009.17 0.29 0.09
2011 108930 0.18 7558.39 –0.06 0.07
2012 125712 0.13 8753.92 0.14 0.07
2013 139744 0.10 10384.2 0.16 0.07
* Units are in 100 million yuan. 
Source: Author’s own, based on data from the National Bureau of Statistics, People’s Re-
public of China.
In order to see whether my proposed measure of policy distance has any 
validity, this exploratory analysis will focus on the construction of the 
dependent variable and whether it exhibits different variance across the 
two countries. This can be problematic in China, because national policy 
pronouncements are made on an annual basis, but there are major policy 
restatements every five years. Similarly, in South Korea, a change in ad-
ministration can signal a different emphasis on policy areas (see Table 2).
The choice of time frame is therefore important. Because this paper would 
like to explore how local governments align themselves as policy shifts at 
the national level, looking at a five-year period that spans two different 
policy regimes in both countries would be advisable. For this reason, data 
between 2004 and 2009 will be examined. In both South Korea and Chi-
na, there was a shift in policy regime during this time. Therefore, the year 
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2007 is chosen as a year in which both countries were at similar points 
before the regime shifts.
Table 2: Republic of Korea, Environmental Expenditures as a Proportion of the 
National Budget, 1998-2011












1998 1,344,939 11,131 0.008
1999 1,539,920 14.4 11,536 3.64 0.0075
2000 1,604,080 4.1 13,023 12.89 0.008
2001 1,617,387 0.8 14,143 8.60 0.009
2002 1,732,841 7.1 14,336 1.36 0.008
2003 1,880,037 8.4 14,036 -2.09 0.0075
2004 1,943,554 3.3 16,575 18.09 0.009
2005 1,999,128 2.8 28,557 72.29 0.0143
2006 2,059,280 3 29,991 5.02 0.0146
2007 2,098,000 1.8 32,231 7.47 0.0154
2008 2,281,859 8.7 35,914 11.43 0.0157
2009 2,565,246 12.4 40,282 12.16 0.0157
2010 2,553,343 -0.4 44,832 11.30 0.0176
2011 2,640,928 3.4 47,778 6.57 0.0181
Source: Author’s own, based on data from the Ministry of the Environment, Environmental 
Statistics Yearbooks, 1998-2011.
As argued by multiple political scientists, if one wishes to know what a 
government truly values, pay little attention to what politicians say – pay 
close attention to where they spend their money (Wildavsky, 1988; Edel-
man, 1967). For this reason, a measure of “policy distance” between the 
central and local governments is chosen as the difference in the propor-
tion of the total budget spent on environmental concerns at the national 
and the local levels. The greater the “distance” between national and local 
priorities, the greater this difference should be. 
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In order to create similar conditions for the behaviour of local officials, 
the cases in China were all chosen within one province in the northeast: 
Liaoning Province. This was done for a number of reasons: first, the prov-
ince is roughly the size of Korea (145,900 square kilometres compared 
to 100,032 square kilometres), and second, it shares some geographical 
features that affect environmental conditions. It is a coastal province with 
both coastal and interior cities, each of which has distinctive econom-
ic and environmental concerns. Cities along the coast, like Dalian, have 
economies dependent on tourism and China’s “second home” industry, 
where the cleanliness of the environment is key to the city’s appeal to 
potential residents, especially those in the upper income brackets. Cities 
further inland, like Benxi and Shenyang, have economies that are heavily 
rooted in the industrial models of the steel and coal industries, so their 
approaches to environmental policy may be expected to be somewhat dif-
ferent if the policy distance between the centre and periphery allows for 
flexibility.
The cities in South Korea are drawn from all over the country, and the mix 
between coastal and interior cities is meant to capture the variety of ap-
proaches local governments may be inclined to take when adopting envi-
ronmental policies. Cities on the eastern coast rely more heavily on fishing 
and tourism (like Sokcho), and therefore may be expected to spend more 
on programs related to maintaining high environmental standards than 
their more industrial counterparts in the northwest (such as Incheon) and 
the southeast (such as Ulsan, home to Hyundai Industries).
Because the number of large cities (with a population of over 1 million) in 
Liaoning Province is much higher than the number of large cities in Ko-
rea, the cities were chosen to roughly balance the proportion of coastal to 
interior cities, or approximately half (6 out of 14 in Liaoning, and 5 out of 
10 in Korea). This is intended to pull a mix of local government incentives 
and interests from both countries that is roughly similar; more coastal 
cities will have an economy based on tourism and a “clean” appeal, while 
others will have an economy based on older industrial models.
5.2. Data Caveats
As might be expected, local budgets are political tools, and therefore are 
prone to heavy oversight by the national government, as well as by local 
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interests. For this reason, there is some incentive on the part of local 
officials to ensure that expenditure reports are consistent rather than ac-
curate. Thus the use of local budget expenditures, especially in China, 
where data is often considered suspect, may not be as reliable a measure 
of policy preferences as desired.
However, budget expenditures in both countries are reported on an an-
nual basis, and there are ways to examine unusual behaviour, if any, fairly 
easily. The more troubling issue is the incentive to fit in. There is an oft-re-
peated expression in East Asia, “The stake that sticks up gets hammered 
down”. The question here may be who the referent group is for compar-
ison. This point will be raised again during the discussion of the data 
analysis and results.
5.3. Preliminary Observations
After collecting the budget data for all the cities in the study, I construct-
ed a policy distance measure in the following way: PDi = [(PropEnvLi) – 
(PropEnvNi)] for each case, where PropEnvL = the proportion of the local 
budget spent on environmental programs; and where PropEnvN = the pro-
portion of the national budget spent on environmental programs in a giv-
en year. Therefore, in a given country, policy distance could be measured 
for any given year by summing the square of PDi, as follows: PDK =  i(PDi).
2 
Thus if the policy distance measure for one country exceeds that for the 
other, one could say that for these cases, there is greater policy distance in 
environmental expenditures. This is basically the sum of squares over all 
the cases within a country context. Over several years, one could take the 
average policy distance if this seemed appropriate given the distribution 
of data across time and cases.
For example, for the year 2007, I calculated the following for the cases in 
Korea and northeastern China (see Table 3). 
The first point worth noting is that there is far more uniformity across 
the Chinese cases than there is across the Korean cases. This is what one 
might expect given the nature of a communist regime. However, there is 
greater distance from the national benchmark in China than there is in 
Korea, indicating that although Korean cities may vary more across lo-
calities, they do not stray as far from the national centre as their Chinese 
counterparts. It is also worth noting that Korean cities on average tend to 
spend a greater proportion of their local budgets on environmental con-
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cerns than the national government, where Chinese cities spend less. This 
seems to lend support to the hypothesis that local governments within the 
two countries orient themselves differently, both towards each other and 
the national government.
Table 3: Policy Distance in 2007 for South Korea and Liaoning Province, Chi-










Sokcho 0.173546499 0.015362726 0.158183773 0.094165492
Shinan 0.170813208 0.015362726 0.155450482
Andong 0.064656635 0.015362726 0.049293909
Jeju 0.10678364 0.015362726 0.091420914
Ulsan 0.128473042 0.015362726 0.113110316
Daegu 0.018538492 0.015362726 0.003175765
Daejeon 0.03131508 0.015362726 0.015952353
Busan 0.002150366 0.015362726 -0.01321236
Incheon 0.030611146 0.015362726 0.01524842
Seoul 0.159325477 0.015362726 0.14396275
Shenyang 0.013581201 0.106226566 -0.092645364 0.113490962
Dalian 0.012689336 0.106226566 -0.09353723
Anshan 0.011416422 0.106226566 -0.094810144
Benxi 0.018888453 0.106226566 -0.087338112
Dandong 0.012542555 0.106226566 -0.09368401
Jinzhou 0.016752547 0.106226566 -0.089474019
Yingkou 0.013202721 0.106226566 -0.093023845
Fuxin 0.009975792 0.106226566 -0.096250773
Liaoyang 0.010087051 0.106226566 -0.096139514
Panjin 0.011529522 0.106226566 -0.094697043
Tieling 0.01365836 0.106226566 -0.092568205
Chaoyang 0.011802572 0.106226566 -0.094423994
Huludao 0.010588523 0.106226566 -0.095638042
Source: Author’s own, based on data from the National Bureau of Statistics, People’s Re-
public of China
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6. Discussion and Next Steps
Although there appears to be preliminary support for the idea that local 
governments in the two countries orient themselves differently (South 
Korea towards the centre and China towards peers), explaining why this 
might be the case is necessary. Two main reasons are offered. The first 
would be cultural. Although both countries share historical ties and com-
mon cultural characteristics, the twentieth century saw substantial diver-
gence between the two nations in a particularly notable way. Within Chi-
na, under the rule of former CCP Chairman Mao Zhedong, there was a 
wholesale rejection of Confucian teaching and norms, which Mao saw as 
antithetical to the modernisation of the Chinese state. Unlike China, Ja-
pan and South Korea kept Confucian principles relatively intact through-
out governing institutions and structures (Choi, Hong & Wright, 2010). 
This distinction would lead one to conclude that Korean officials would 
be more likely to behave in ways that demonstrate Confucian notions of 
propriety and loyalty than their Chinese counterparts. Part of propriety 
would be accepting one’s position in society and the authority of one’s 
superiors without question.5 In Mao’s China, such ideas were roundly 
criticised and attacked as “feudal thinking”, especially during the Cultural 
Revolution (Bianco, 1971). This rejection of Confucian norms, especially 
the shifting of the basis for determining authority, led to an upheaval in 
the social structure that has lingered (Fewsmith, 2000).
The second reason would be ideological. As mentioned previously, the 
importance of ideology in China transcends many other influential var-
iables. In South Korea, ideology has been somewhat subsumed by the 
rise of competing political parties, so there are clearer indicators of what 
the prevailing leaning of the ruling class might be. But in China, because 
there is only the CCP, determining such leanings is much more difficult, 
both for public officials and for researchers. Thus there are different pres-
sures within the two systems that lead to different orientations among 
public officials with respect to centre-periphery relations. In South Korea, 
the continuation of Confucian norms orients officials towards the central 
government. However, the expectation is that each locality will petition 
the central government for the status of “favourite child”. However, be-
5 It should be noted that accepting one’s place in society and the authority of one’s 
superiors does not necessarily mean uncritical acceptance. In South Korean neo-Confucian 
approaches to governing, officials were often critical of behaviour they saw as contrary to 
Confucian doctrine, even if that behaviour came from higher quarters (Kim, 2012).
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cause the central government may change priorities when administrations 
change (which is now required because no president can stand for re-elec-
tion), the role of “favourite child” will move as power at the centre shifts. 
Thus the relationship that matters most in terms of discretionary privileg-
es is the one between the central government and the local government 
(Kim, 2012).
In China, although there are shifts at the centre, the relative importance 
of different policy areas is far more subtle, and any changes must go 
through an important level prior to reaching local governments: the pro-
vincial level. The relationships, therefore, are structurally different and are 
meant to be far less discretionary in impact. Thus figuring out what the 
centre intends means going beyond what is stated officially, or even what 
the national budget suggests priorities might be. Therefore, I propose the 
following hypotheses for future research:
Hyp0: There is no difference between the variance of local environmental 
budget allocations across local governments between China and South 
Korea, or Var(C) = Var (K) = 0.
In other words, there will not be a significant difference across local gov-
ernment jurisdictions in terms of local budget allocations in either coun-
try, signifying relative comportment in line with the central government’s 
directives.
HypA1: The variance of local budget environmental allocations in South 
Korea will be greater across local governments than in China, because less 
attention is paid to peer behaviour.
HypA2: The influence of interest groups on local budget allocation will be 
mediated by a political party in South Korea, but not in China.
HypA3: Local environmental conditions (such as levels of air pollutants) 
will have a greater influence on local budget behaviour in Korea than in 
China (response to electorate).
In other words, if the majority of seats on the local government council 
are held by the same party which is in power at the national level, then 
local interest groups with policy agendas contrary to those of the party 
in power will have a reduced impact on budget allocations in the desired 
directions. This may, however, be affected by high levels of air pollution 
in South Korea, where local officials can be removed from office by a dis-
satisfied latent public, but not in China, where such removal would not 
necessarily be seen as affecting the problem.
These hypotheses address the orientation of local governments towards 
each other and towards the centre, but thus far the concept of policy dis-
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tance has just been demonstrated, not incorporated. If the local govern-
ment is closer to the centre in its policy orientation, as appears to be the 
case in South Korea, then the impact of local factors, such as economic 
disparity or the influence of interest groups (Lim & Tang, 2002), will be 
relatively diminished. However, the distinction between the centre and 
the periphery in terms of policy adherence can be problematic if the poli-
cy is outlined in very general or vague language. In China, this is often the 
case, because the wording of a policy can be fraught with symbolic impli-
cations, and there are multiple groups who are looking for shifts, however 
imperceptible they may be to an outsider, in the policy orientation of the 
CCP (Fewsmith, 2000). So, how do we overcome this problem?
One possibility is, of course, that the idea of physical distance as well 
as political and administrative distance can create distortions in the way 
in which central policies are understood. If there are certain norms that 
are shared across groups (such as party solidarity or a strong civil ser-
vice), these can shorten policy distance. Additionally, physical proximity 
can mean oversight from the centre is easier and monitoring costs are re-
duced. If a given local government has relatively little policy distance from 
the centre, then one might expect the proportion of budget allocations 
to follow the central government’s proportions fairly closely. With these 
ideas in mind, I propose the following hypotheses:
Hyp0a: There will be no significant difference between the proportion of 
budget allocations for environmental policy at the national and local levels.
HypA1a: There will be a significant difference between the proportion of 
budget allocations for environmental policy at the national and local lev-
els when local environmental conditions are significantly worse than the 
national average.
HypA2a: There will be a significant difference between the proportion of 
budget allocations for environmental policy at the national and local levels 
when local political party affiliation is different from the national majority.
HypA3a: There will be a negative relationship between the strength of the 
civil service and the difference between the proportion of budget alloca-
tions for environmental policy at the national and local levels.
In order to test these hypotheses, and perhaps better refine the measure 
of policy distance, more data will need to be collected. But should ad-
ditional tests continue to support the preliminary results reported here, 
there are important implications for some of the general suppositions in 
the literature about the nature of centre-periphery relations in political 
and economic systems.
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The notion that there is a clear correlation between the degree of auton-
omy granted to local governments and the degree to which those local 
governments may respond to central directives has been re-examined in 
light of the Korean and Chinese contexts. The importance of ideology in 
both contexts and the different effects of Confucian cultural constructs 
may account for the difference in behaviour across national boundaries in 
a manner unexplored within the traditional variables borrowed from the 
literature in the West. For these reasons, distance from the centre to the 
periphery is important to measure, but the conclusions we draw about 
decentralisation in unitary environments should be offered with care. Our 
theoretical toolkits may not always travel as well as we would like them to. 
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DECENTRALISING UNITARY GOVERNMENTS WITHOUT A MAP, 
OR LEARNING HOW TO SALSA WHEN WE ONLY KNOW  
HOW TO WALTZ
Summary
This paper examines disparities between unitary central governments and local 
governments in how environmental policy is defined and implemented at the 
local level. This is done within the context of northeast Asia, where results can 
often differ from expectations driven by traditional models of local government 
behaviour offered by the West. The author constructs a theoretical measure for 
policy distance between the central government and its subsidiaries and then 
operationalise the measure in a comparative context within northeastern China 
and the Republic of Korea. Because of their proximity, these regions share envi-
ronmental concerns that cross international boundaries, and both countries have 
gone through an unusually rapid decentralisation of decision-making within 
the environmental policy arena. This has produced a range of responses to envi-
ronmental concerns at the local level, allowing for a comparative examination 
of the relative importance of structural, political, and economic constructs with 
regard to policy expenditures. Using local and national budget data from 23 
cities with histories of environmental issues (13 in northeast China and 10 in 
South Korea), the author’s measure of policy distance between the centre and the 
periphery is tested. It is found that, contrary to traditional model expectations, 
there is far greater concurrence between local governments and the national gov-
ernment within a democratic nation than there is within a communist one.
Keywords: decentralisation, local government, China, South Korea, policy dis-
tance
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DECENTRALIZACIJA UNITARNIH DRŽAVA BEZ ZEMLJOPISNE 
KARTE: KAD PLESAČI VALCERA UČE SALSU
Sažetak
U radu se razmatra kako središnja vlast unitarne države tumači i provodi po-
litiku upravljanja okolišem na lokalnoj razini te kako to čini njezina lokalna 
samouprava. Kontekst je sjeveroistočna Azija gdje se konkretni rezultati često 
ne poklapaju s očekivanjima nametnutima proučavanjem tradicionalnih obra-
zaca koje slijede lokalne samouprave u zapadnim zemljama. Autorica predla-
že način mjerenja policy distance (udaljenosti kod stvaranja politika) između 
središnje vlasti i podređenih jedinica te ga primjenjuje u usporednom kontekstu 
sjeveroistočne Kine i Republike Koreje. Ta su dva područja zemljopisno bliska te 
ih povezuju problemi okoliša koji nadilaze međunarodne granice. Također, obje 
su zemlje doživjele neuobičajeno brz proces decentralizacije politike upravljanja 
okolišem. To je na lokalnoj razini dovelo do različitih reakcija na probleme oko-
liša te je omogućilo usporedbu relativne važnosti strukturnih, političkih i eko-
nomskih pitanja s obzirom na troškove provedbe politike upravljanja okolišem. 
U radu su korišteni podaci lokalnog i državnog proračuna za 23 grada koji 
imaju dugogodišnje probleme s upravljanjem okolišem (13 gradova u sjeveroi-
stočnoj Kini i 10 u Južnoj Koreji) te se pomoću tih podataka testira prijedlog au-
torice kako izmjeriti policy distancu između centra i udaljenih jedinica. Unatoč 
očekivanjima zasnovanima na tradicionalnom modelu, rezultati upućuju na 
daleko veće slaganje lokalne samouprave i državne vlasti u demokratskoj državi 
nego u komunističkom sustavu.
Ključne riječi: decentralizacija, lokalna samouprava, Kina, Južna Koreja, po-
licy distanca
